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This article incorporates tax evasion into an optimum taxation framework with individ-
uals di￿ering in earning abilities and initial wealth. We ￿nd that despite the possibility
of its evasion a tax on initial wealth should supplement the optimal nonlinear income
tax, given a positive correlation between initial wealth and earning abilities. Further,
even if income and initial wealth are taxed optimally, it is still desirable to levy a tax
on commodities, though it can be evaded as well. Thus, our result provides a rationale
for a comprehensive tax system. Optimal tax rates on commodities di￿er in general,
however for the special case of a uniform evasion technology it turns out that equal
rates are optimal if preferences are homothetic and weakly separable.
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When designing the tax system, governments have to observe the possibility that individuals and
￿rms try to ￿nd legal or even illegal ways in order to escape (part of) the tax liability. This reaction
of the taxpayers severely restricts the extent to which a particular tax can be used as an instrument
for ￿nancing publicly provided goods or for redistribution. For instance, it is often claimed that
￿nancial wealth can easily be concealed from tax authorities by moving assets o￿shore or by simply
not reporting the true amount of wealth. 1 Then most notably the rich, who are intended to bear
the major burden, given that wealth is distributed unequally in most societies, do not contribute
as a much as one might expect. Another important issue in tax policy is the avoidance of indirect
taxes, such as the value added tax in the European Union. 2
In this article we analyze the question of whether taxes on wealth and on the consumption of
goods are adequate instruments in an optimal tax system, if the possibility of evading them is
accounted for. So far the issues of optimal taxation and tax evasion have largely been treated
separately in the literature. The optimal income taxation literature starting with Mirrlees (1971)
ignores with very view exceptions the problem of tax evasion, which is at odds with high levels
of tax evasion observed in reality. On the other hand the tax-evasion literature starting with
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Kolm (1973) takes the tax system as given and focuses on the
taxpayer’s evasion decision as well as on the determination of optimal audit rates and penalties.
We construct a framework, which allows us to analyze the trade-o￿ between redistribution and
e￿ciency losses due to tax evasion. For this, we extend the standard Mirrlees optimum taxation
model in two ways. First, we introduce initial wealth as a second distinguishing characteristic of
individuals in addition to heterogeneous ability levels. Second, we assume that taxes on initial
wealth and on commodities are subject to tax evasion. The central question of the analysis is
whether in such a framework an optimal nonlinear income tax should be supplemented by taxes
on initial wealth and on commodities, despite the existence of tax evasion.
There are two related studies which introduce tax evasion into an optimum taxation framework
and analyze the role of commodity taxes. Cremer and Gahvari (1993) also assume, as we do, that
taxes on commodities but not on income can be evaded. They analyze the in￿uence of tax evasion
on optimal commodity taxes in a representative-agent model a la Ramsey. Boadway et al. (1994)
analyze the optimal tax problem in a Mirrlees model, if individuals evade income taxes. They
try to explain the direct-indirect tax mix observed in most countries. As indirect taxes may be
1The existence of tax havens represents a particular opportunity for this, as is revealed by the recent debate on
information transmission from foreign banks to the tax authorities in their customers’ home countries.
2For a recent overview on evasion of the VAT see Keen and Smith (2006).
2more di￿cult to evade than direct taxes and as the incentive to evade may increase with tax rates,
they argue that indirect taxes can be a useful supplement in an optimal tax system. This result is
similar to what we ￿nd, but in our study it is the evasion of the tax on initial wealth, which makes
taxes on commodities desirable, even if the latter can be evaded as well. 3
A simplifying assumption in our article is to take initial wealth as exogenously given. The
most appealing interpretation of initial wealth is that it consists of inheritances received from the
previous generation. However, as our model is static, it does not allow to study the dynamics
behind this issue. There exist some other papers which do pay attention to the fact that initial
wealth creates a second distinguishing characteristic, in addition to earning abilities. Cremer et
al. (2001) also consider a static economy with exogenously given initial wealth, which is however
unobservable to the social planner. They investigate the role of commodity taxes in such an
economy in the presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax. Similarly, Boadway et al. (2000)
and Cremer et al. (2003) study the desirability of a tax on capital income as a surrogate for the
taxation of inheritances, which again are assumed to be unobservable. In contrast to these studies
Brunner and Pech (2008) assume that wealth is observable to the social planner. As their model
is dynamic they are able to analyze the optimal taxation of inheritances. In the present study we
drop the extreme assumptions of complete observability and unobservability respectively. In our
model the social planner can only observe wealth reported to tax authorities, but not the true size
of initial wealth. Individuals can conceal part of their wealth from tax authorities under some cost,
for example by moving assets o￿shore or by simply not reporting the true amount of wealth.
In the economy we describe, individuals use labor income together with initial wealth for the
consumption of two goods. There exists a nonlinear income tax, a proportional tax on initial
wealth and per-unit taxes on commodities. For simplicity we assume that there are only two types
of individuals who di￿er in ability and initial wealth. The high-able individual also owns a higher
amount of initial wealth, thus we assume that there is a ￿xed relationship between abilities and
wealth. Earning abilities are unobservable to the social planner and initial wealth is only partly
observable due to the existence of tax evasion. The social planner wants to redistribute from high-
to low-able individuals. Regarding the income tax the planner is restricted because of the well
known e￿ciency-equity trade-o￿ that arises in Mirrlees’ optimal tax problem with asymmetric
information. In our model redistribution is also possible with taxes on initial wealth and on
commodities, but the existence of tax evasion adds a restriction on redistributing with these tax
3Cremer and Gahvari (1995) and Pestieau et al. (2004) also incorporate tax evasion into an optimum taxation
framework. Both articles concentrate on the income tax and study the joint determination of optimal tax rates
and audit policies.
3instruments. To keep the model simple and tractable, we introduce tax evasion in a rather stylized
way. Individuals and ￿rms can evade taxes under some cost, but once they have incurred those
costs, they cannot be detected by tax authorities. Thus, there is no decision under uncertainty as
in the Allingham - Sandmo tax evasion model.
In a ￿rst step we analyze whether an optimal nonlinear income tax should be supplemented by
a tax on initial wealth. We ￿nd that despite the existence of tax evasion a positive tax on initial
wealth is always optimal in our model and that the size of the tax depends on two e￿ects. On the
one hand taxing initial wealth allows for further redistribution, as the high-able individual also
owns a larger amount of wealth. On the other hand a higher tax rate leads to an increase in taxes
evaded and might thus even reduce tax revenues.
In a second step we analyze the role of commodity taxes in an optimal tax system. The famous
Atkinson - Stiglitz result (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976) states that an optimal nonlinear income
tax does not need to be supplemented by commodity taxes if preferences on labor supply and
consumption are weakly separable. However, this result is derived in a model where individuals
di￿er only in earning abilities. If, additionally, individuals di￿er in initial wealth, Cremer et al.
(2001) have shown that a role for commodity taxes arises. In contrast to our study they assume
that initial wealth is completely unobservable and can therefore not be taxed at all. We ￿nd that
even if initial wealth is taxed optimally and even if preferences are weakly separable, welfare can
be further increased by the use of commodity taxes even though they are exposed to tax evasion.
After having shown that it is optimal to use all available tax instruments we are also interested
in the optimal structure of commodity taxes. It turns out that without further simplifying as-
sumptions not much can be said, besides that optimal commodity taxes will di￿er in general. To
get a better understanding, we consider two special cases. First, we assume that evasion costs are
uniform among commodities. There we ￿nd that uniform commodity taxes are optimal if prefer-
ences are homothetic in consumption. The second case assumes that taxes on one of the two goods
cannot be evaded at all. Contrary to intuition it turns out that one cannot exclude the case that
calls for taxing the good higher for which tax evasion is possible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the
optimal taxation of initial wealth and section 4 deals with the taxation of commodities, including
the analysis of the optimal structure of commodity taxes. Finally, section 4 concludes.
42 The model
In the economy there exist two types of individuals i = L;H. The types di￿er in two charac-
teristics, namely in earning abilities !L < !H and exogenously given initial wealth eL < eH, i.e.
we assume a ￿xed relationship between abilities and initial wealth. There is a large number of
individuals of each type i = L;H; we normalize the size of each group to one. 4 Individuals live
for one period, in which they work and consume. By providing labor supply li they obtain a
pre-tax income zi = !ili. Gross income zi is subject to a nonlinear income tax and the resulting
net income is denoted by xi. Initial wealth is taxed at a proportional rate e. Individuals use
after-tax income xi together with net initial wealth for the consumption cji of two commodities
j = 1;2, which are subject to per-unit taxes denoted by j. Commodities are produced by a
large number of ￿rms in two industries, with perfect competition among the identical ￿rms in
each industry. Again the size (the set of ￿rms) of each industry is normalized to one. Labor is
the only input to production and technologies are assumed to be linear. Quantities are chosen in
such a way that the (constant) marginal costs of production are equal to one for both commodities.
Individual behavior
Taxes on initial wealth and on commodities are exposed to tax evasion. First, consider the
households’ concealment technology for the wealth tax. An individual of type i conceals a fraction
ei of initial wealth from tax authorities at the expense of concealment costs depending on the
fraction ei. Once individuals have incurred those costs they cannot be detected by tax authorities,
thus there is no decision under uncertainty in the model. Concealment costs depend on the evaded
amount in the following way:5 concealing one unit of ei entails a resource cost described by the
function Kei(ei), which is assumed to be an increasing and convex function of the evaded share
ei, with Kei(0) = 0. Total concealment costs for individual i are then equal to eieiKei(ei). To
simplify notation we de￿ne kei(ei)  eiKei(ei).6
Both types of individuals have the same strictly concave utility function, u(c1i;c2i;li), with
@u=@cji > 0;@u=@li < 0. Individuals maximize their utility subject to the private budget constraint
p1c1i + p2c2i  xi + Reiei (1)
4More formally, the members of each group are represented by the real numbers in the interval [0,1], whose size
(Lebesgue measure) is one.
5Cremer and Gahvari (1993) and Boadway et al. (1994) model tax evasion in a similar manner.




5with consumer prices denoted by pj, j = 1;2, and where Rei  1   e(1   ei)   kei(ei). For
an individual i, Reiei represents the amount that remains after the deduction of the tax on the
reported wealth and of the evasion costs; thus Reiei can be interpreted as her e￿ective net initial
wealth, which together with net labor income xi can be spent on consumption.
From the ￿rst-order-condition for the optimal ei one gets
e = @kei(ei)=@ei; (2)
i.e. individuals conceal wealth until the marginal cost of concealment equals its marginal bene￿t.
Observe that the optimal fraction ei is determined solely by the tax rate and is independent of
total initial wealth ei, which follows from the assumption that per-unit evasion costs depend only
on the fraction ei. Due to convexity @ei(e)=@e = (@2kei(ei)=@2
ei) 1 > 0 holds. That is, the
model has the realistic property that the fraction ei of hidden wealth rises with the tax rate. 7
Morerover, note that we allow the evasion technology to di￿er among individuals, hence in general
they evade di￿erent fractions of ei.
Firm behavior
Commodity taxes are levied on ￿rms, which have access to an evasion technology similar to that
of the households. Each ￿rm of industry j evades commodity taxes by concealing a fraction j of
its sales again at a cost depending on the evaded fraction j.Let cj denote the produced quantity
of a ￿rm in industry j. Concealing one unit of good j entails a resource cost described by the
function Kj(j), with @Kj(j)=@j > 0, @2Kj(j)=@2
j  0 and Kj(0) = 0. Again we de￿ne
kj(j)  jKj(j). Then the maximization problem of a ￿rm in industry j can be written as
maxj = pjcj   cj   (1   j)jcj   cjkj(j): (3)
The right-hand side of (3) consists of sale revenues minus the cost of production (remember that
the constant marginal costs are equal to one), minus taxes paid to tax authorities and minus the
7This is in accordance with a large majority of empirical studies on this subject. See among others Clotfelter
(1983), Andreoni et. al. (1998) and Pudney et. al. (2000). It contrasts the expected-utility model of income tax
evasion due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), where evaders are penalized if detected by tax authorities. In this
model the e￿ect of an increase in marginal tax rates on tax evasion is ambiguous, if individuals are risk averse and
if absolute risk aversion decreases with income. Yitzhaki (1974) even shows that if the penalty is proportional
to the amount of taxes evaded - and not to the amount of income evaded as in the Allingham-Sandmo model -
tax evasion will even decrease when the tax rate rises.
6cost of tax evasion. Solving the ￿rst order condition for the optimal fraction j one gets
j = @kj(j)=@j; (4)
thus ￿rms also evade taxes until the marginal cost of concealment equals its marginal bene￿t.
As before the optimal j is determined solely by the tax rate j and is thus independent of the
amount cj sold by the ￿rm. Also @j(j)=@j > 0 still holds. In equilibrium ￿rms supply good j
at a consumer price
pj = 1 + j(1   j) + kj(j); (5)
with j chosen optimally according to (4). The corresponding producer price is equal to the
constant marginal costs (equal to one). Observe that without tax evasion the consumer price is
equal to 1 + j. Hence, all gains of tax evasion (jj   kj(j)) are transmitted to consumers via
a lower consumer price, and ￿rms make zero pro￿ts (as usual under the assumption of a linear
technology). Finally, the equilibrium quantity of each commodity j = 1;2 is determined by the
aggregate demand function cjL + cjH.
The social planner’s problem
In a next step we describe the social planner’s maximization problem. For this purpose we ￿rst
introduce the indirect utility function of household i for given tax rates e;1;2 and given net and
gross income xi;zi,
vi(xi;zi;ei;e;1;2)  maxfu(c1i;c2i;zi=!i)jp1c1i + p2c2i  xi + Reieig: (6)
First-best taxes referring to abilities are not implementable, because abilities are not observable to
the social planner. Nor can the social planner infer abilities from initial wealth, as only reported
wealth is observable.8 Therefore the tax authority imposes an income tax as a second-best instru-
ment. As there are no restrictions on the functional form of the income tax the standard way of
solving such a problem is to maximize a social welfare function with respect to the individuals’ net
8One may argue that with a ￿xed relationship between abilities and initial wealth the social planner could in
principle identify individuals by observing reported wealth, and impose a lump-sum tax on abilities. This would
make the high-able individual worse o￿ than the low-able individual (Mirrlees, 1974) and, thus, be a further
incentive for the H type to conceal wealth. We avoid this complexity by assuming that the social planner can
commit not to impose a lump-sum tax on abilities by using information transmitted through reported wealth.
Note, that a related problem arises also in the standard Mirrlees optimum income tax model (Mirrlees, 1971):
Given a tax schedule, gross income of high-able individuals is higher than gross income of low-able individuals.
Thus, ex-post the social planner could identify individuals as well.
7and gross income bundles (xL;zL), (xH;zH), subject to a self-selection constraint and a resource
constraint. By this the optimal income tax for the two types of individuals is determined implicitly
as the di￿erence zi   xi, i = L:H. The other available tax instruments e, 1 and 2 are taken as
￿xed at some rate for the moment.




fLvL(xL;zL;eL;e;1;2) + fHvH(xH;zH;eH;e;1;2); (7)
where fL and fH, with fL  fH  0, represent the weights of the two types of individuals.
As usual we assume that preferences ful￿ll the condition of "agent monotonicity" (Seade, 1982).
Formally this means that MRSL
zx > MRSH
zx holds at any vector (x;z), where MRSi
zx is de￿ned
as MRSi
zx   (@vi=@zi)=(@vi=@xi). This assumption - also known as the single crossing condition
- implies that for any income tax function the high-able individual does not choose to earn less
income than the low-able.9
Whereas the objective function is standard, the resource constraint has to be modi￿ed in our
setting. It reads
xL + xH  zL + zH + e((1   eL)eL + (1   eH)eH) +
1(1   1)(c1L + c1H) + 2(1   2)(c2L + c2H)   g: (8)
The social planner has to collect tax revenues in order to ￿nance public spending g. One can see
that the base for a tax on initial wealth is reported wealth and not the true amount of wealth.
The same holds for the base of commodity taxes j;j = 1;2. As reported wealth and reported
consumption decrease with increasing tax rates, an increase of e, 1 and 2 might even reduce tax
revenues. For the taxation of initial wealth the possibility of a La￿er e￿ect only arises due to the
existence of tax evasion. This is not the case for the taxation of a single good j, where a La￿er
e￿ect might also arise without the possibility of tax evasion due to the existence of substitution
e￿ects. Further note that resources spent on the concealment activity represent pure waste, as
they are not included in the resource constraint.
The self-selection constraint is again standard. We restrict the analysis to cases, where the
social planner wants to redistribute from high- to low-ability persons and, due to the assumption
9It should be mentioned that the existence of initial endowments makes the assumption of agent-monotonicity
more problematic than in the standard case. The reason is that with eH su￿ciently larger than eL the high-able
individual might demand at least as much additional net income as compensation for achieving an additional
unit of gross income as the low-ability individual.
8of agent monotonicity, only the self-selection constraint, which prevents the high-able individual
from mimicking the low-able individual (i.e. from choosing the bundle which is intended for the
low-able) is binding in the optimum. The self-selection constraint reads
vH(xH;zH;eH;e;1;2)  vH(xL;zL;eH;e;1;2): (9)
Maximizing (7) subject to (8) and (9) with respect to xi and zi yields the ￿rst-order conditions for
the optimal bundles of net and gross income. The Lagrange multipliers of the resource constraint
and the self-selection constraint are denoted by  for the former and by  for the latter. The
marginal utility of income of the high-able individual in the case of mimicking is described by
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The optimal income tax is described implicitly by these conditions for given tax rates 1;2;e
(possibly zero). This is the starting point for the analysis in the next two sections. Given an
optimal income tax we want to ￿nd out whether taxes on initial wealth and on commodities can
further increase social welfare, despite the presence of tax evasion. Clearly, in an economy without
tax evasion a tax on exogenously given wealth would be lump-sum and therefore a desirable tax
instrument for redistributive reasons, given that ability and wealth are positively correlated. The
same holds true for a uniform expenditure tax, which Brunner and Pech (2008) have shown to be
equivalent to a tax on initial wealth in an economy without tax evasion. How those results have
to be modi￿ed due to the existence of tax evasion will be shown in the following sections.
93 Optimal taxation of initial wealth
In this section we concentrate on the taxation of initial wealth, therefore commodity taxes are
assumed to be zero. When analyzing whether a proportional tax on initial wealth is a useful sup-
plement to an optimal income tax the social planner has to take two aspects into account. On
the one hand a tax on initial wealth allows for further redistribution, as the high-able individual
also owns a larger amount of wealth. But on the other hand a higher tax rate leads to an increase
in taxes evaded and might thus even reduce tax revenues. Proposition 1 addresses this trade-o￿
faced by the social planner. Let the optimal value function of the maximization problem (7)-(9)
be denoted by S(e;1;2).
Proposition 1: The welfare e￿ect of a marginal increase of a tax e on initial wealth, given













Despite the existence of tax evasion a positive tax rate on initial wealth is always optimal in our
model, as @S
@e je=0> 0.
Proof: The derivation of equation (14) is provided in the Appendix.
One can see that the welfare e￿ect of a marginal increase of e consists of two di￿erent parts
with opposite signs. The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of equation (14) describes the e￿ect
on the self-selection constraint. It is unambiguously positive given that the high-able individual
reports a higher amount of wealth to tax authorities than the low-able individual. That is, if
(1 eH)eH > (1 eL)eL an increase of e relaxes the self-selection constraint. 10 To understand
the intuition behind this mechanism, it helps to split it up into two steps. Assume in a ￿rst step
that after a marginal increase of e each individual i can be fully compensated for the loss of net
initial wealth @(Reiei)=@e =  (1 ei)ei
11 by an increase of net income of the same amount. This
makes mimicking less attractive, as long as the compensation (1 ei)ei is higher for the high-able
individual, and relaxes the self-selection constraint. Then in a second step further redistribution
via the income tax becomes possible and this in turn increases social welfare.
10Observe that if eL  eH the e￿ect becomes zero only if both individuals evade all their wealth. If, however,
eH > eL it becomes zero for positive amounts of wealth reported to tax authorities.
11Use the de￿nition for Rei following (1) and apply the envelope theorem.
10However, due to tax evasion individuals cannot be fully compensated, as an increase of e also
increases the fraction of wealth concealed by individuals. This is taken into account by the second
part of the RHS of (14), which a￿ects the resource constraint. It is always negative except for
a zero tax rate, where it obviously is zero. It can be interpreted as the deadweight loss of tax
evasion. The intuition behind this e￿ect is that an increase of e leads to a decline in the fraction
of wealth reported and therefore has a negative in￿uence on attainable tax revenues. Cleary this
occurs due to our formulation of tax evasion, where the proportion of hidden wealth increases with
the tax rate.
Although individuals have the possibility to conceal wealth from tax authorities, a positive tax
on initial wealth is always optimal in our model, as @S
@e je=0> 0. This is due to the fact that the
e￿ect on the self-selection constraint is positive at e = 0, because ei = 0 and eH > eL, while the
e￿ect on the resource constraint is zero at e = 0.
Next we turn to the characterization of the optimal tax on initial wealth. Obviously the optimum
occurs when @S
@e = 0, thus it is obtained by setting the RHS of (14) equal to zero, which is the ￿rst-
order condition of the maximization problem (7)-(9) for e. Intuitively, the social planner should
increase e as long as the positive redistributive e￿ect is larger than the negative deadweight loss
e￿ect and set the optimal tax rate 
e such that both e￿ects have the same size.
We know from above that the optimal tax rate is greater than zero. On the other hand, it
cannot be optimal to set such a high tax rate that both types of individuals conceal all their
wealth, i.e. ei = 1 for i = L;H, because then government revenues are the same as at a tax
rate of zero while evasion costs are wasted. Obviously, it depends on the evasion cost functions,
whether individuals choose to conceal all their wealth. This case cannot occur if marginal cost of
evasion become prohibitively high, i.e. if @kei(1)=@ei = 1. Otherwise there exists a threshold ^ ei
for each individual i such that ei(e) = 1 for all e  ^ ei and ei(e) < 1 for all e < ^ ei. That is,
^ ei is the lowest tax rate at which individual i conceals all her wealth. One ￿nds that the optimal
tax rate ful￿lls 
e < ^ eH. This is immediate if ^ eL  ^ eH, because then both individuals would
conceal everything at a tax rate e  ^ eH. Further if ^ eL > ^ eH, it turns out that (14) is negative
at ^ eH (this follows from eL(^ eH) < 1 and eH(^ eH) = 1, while @ei=@e at ^ eH is positive for
i = L and zero for i = H), which tells us that the optimum tax rate 
e must be lower than ^ eH.
In general, given the optimal tax rate we cannot determine the sign of Rei(
e) = 1   
e(1  
ei)   kei(ei). In order to exclude the implausible case that e￿ective net wealth is negative, we
assume that evasion costs ful￿ll the condition kei(1)  1, i = L;H. That is, the total cost eikei(1)
for an individual i of concealing all initial wealth does not exceed ei.
11Lemma 1: If kei(1)  1, then Rei(e)  0 for all e and Rei(e) > 0 for e < ^ ei.
Proof: First, observe that for all e  ^ ei, Rei(ei) = 1   kei(1) (remember that ei(ei) = 1
for all e  ^ ei ), which is nonnegative, if kei(1)  1. For all e < ^ ei we have @Rei(e)=@e =
 (1   ei) < 0. Altogether this proofs the Lemma. Q.E.D.
Knowing that given the condition kei(1)  1, e￿ective net wealth is always nonnegative, we con-
clude for the high-able individual that ReH > 0 holds at the optimum tax rate 
e, as 
e < ^ eH
(from above). However, for the low-able individual we cannot exclude that ReL = 0 at the optimal
tax rate 
e. The latter situation arises if 
e  ^ eL and keL(1) = 1.12
Still whether ReH R ReL at the optimal tax rate 
e depends on the evasion technology of the
individuals. If the marginal cost of tax evasion @kei(ei)=@ei is larger for the low-able individual
at any ei, ReH > ReL holds as then the per-unit rent of tax evasion eei   kei(ei) is larger for
the H type. Obviously, in that case the e￿ective net wealth Reiei is higher for the H type at the
optimal tax rate. If, however, the marginal cost of tax evasion is lower for the L type, then we
have ReL > ReH and the e￿ective net wealth could arise to be higher for the L type. We abstract
from this case and assume for the rest of the analysis that ReHeH > ReLeL holds. There are two
arguments which corroborate this assumption. First, it is plausible that wealthier individuals also
have an at least as good access to tax evasion activities as the low-able, implying lower (or equal)
marginal cost of tax evasion and ReH  ReL. Second, even in the opposite case of ReL > ReH the
inequality ReHeH > ReLeL may hold, given eH > eL. Altogether, the case of ReHeH > ReLeL is
certainly the more realistic scenario.
4 Optimal taxation of commodities
A classical result on the role of indirect taxes in an optimal tax system is due to Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976). They showed that when preferences are weakly separable in labor supply and
consumption, nonlinear income taxation does not need to be supplemented by commodity taxes.
However, this result is derived in a model, where individuals di￿er in only one characteristic,
namely in earning abilities. In a more recent paper Cremer et al. (2001) have shown that even if
preferences are weakly separable between labor and consumption, commodity taxation is a useful
12Note that (1   eL) enters (14) with opposite sign compared to (1   eH), therefore the argument for 
e < ^ eH
does not apply for the low-able individual.
12instrument of tax policy if individuals di￿er not only in abilities but also in endowments. The role
of commodity taxation in their model is to tax indirectly initial endowments which are assumed
to be unobservable. This is in contrast to our model where endowments are partly observable
and where reported endowments are subject to taxation. We proof in the following that even if
endowments are taxed optimally and in addition individuals can evade commodity taxes, there still
remains a role for commodity taxes in an optimal tax system. Furthermore, we analyze the role of
tax evasion on the optimal structure of commodity taxes, similar to Cremer and Gahvari (1993).
Their study analyses the in￿uence of tax evasion on optimal taxes in a representative agent model
￿ la Ramsey and is thus, in contrast to our study, not concerned with redistribution.
The welfare e￿ect of commodity taxation is determined by di￿erentiating the optimal value
function of (7)-(9) with respect to j.
Proposition 2: The welfare e￿ect of a marginal increase of a tax j on commodity j = 1;2,






















Given that commodity j is a normal good and that preferences are weakly separable between labor
supply and consumption, welfare can be further increased by an introduction of a commodity tax,
as @S
@j jj=0> 0.
Proof: The derivation of equation (15) is provided in the Appendix.
In formula (15), Hicksian compensated demand for good k is denoted by ccom
ki and ~ k  k(1 k).
Proposition 2 states that despite the existence of tax evasion positive commodity taxes on nor-
mal goods are optimal in our model, even if preferences between labor supply and consumption
are weakly separable. From equation (15) one can see that the total welfare e￿ect of a marginal
increase of j consists of three e￿ects, one redistributional e￿ect on the self-selection constraint
(multiplier ) and two e￿ciency e￿ects on the resource constraint (multiplier ). First, consider
the e￿ect on the self-selection constraint. Observe that in the case of normal goods the high-able
individual when mimicking consumes more than the low-able individual, i.e. cjH[L] > cjL, because
of ReHeH > ReLeL. Consequently a marginal increase of j hurts the mimicker more than the
13mimicked individual, as long as j < 1 (￿rms report a positive amount of sales, thus the consumer
price increases with j).13 In other words mimicking becomes less attractive, which relaxes the
self-selection constraint. Hence, the redistributional e￿ect of j is positive.
The e￿ciency e￿ects in equation (15) describe the deadweight loss due to tax evasion and the
distorting e￿ects on compensated demand. The interpretation of the deadweight loss e￿ect induced
by tax evasion, which is described by the second term on the right hand side of (15), is quite similar
to the one given in the preceding section for the case of wealth taxes. Higher tax rates lead to an
increase of the fraction of hidden sales and therefore reduce the tax base for the commodity tax.
Finally, the last term in equation (15) represents the e￿ects on compensated demand associated
with the distortion of the consumer price pj due to an increase of j. Both e￿ciency e￿ects are of
second order, thus for a zero tax rate they are zero, while the e￿ect on the self-selection constraint
is positive at j = 0. Hence an introduction of a commodity tax increases welfare. 14 To summarize,
a role for commodity taxes arises in our model even if they are exposed to tax evasion and even
if exogenous initial wealth is taxed optimally. Thus in the economy we describe, it is optimal to
supplement the income tax by all other available tax instruments. The reason is that this allows
to balance the deadweight loss e￿ects created by tax evasion.
It is interesting to note that in an economy without initial wealth cjH[L] = cjL holds, if prefer-
ences are weakly separable in labor supply and consumption. Then one obviously returns to the
classical Atkinson-Stiglitz result. 15
After having shown that commodity taxation increases welfare we now turn to the discussion of
the optimal structure of commodity taxes. We consider the case of normal goods. The optimal tax
structure is described by the following relationship, which is obtained by setting the ￿rst-order-































It turns out that insights into the optimal tax structure are rather limited. It depends on the
relative size of the redistributional and e￿ciency e￿ects, which in turn depend on preferences and
on the evasion technologies for both commodity taxes. However, as the size of those e￿ects remains
13Note that @pj=@j = 1   j. With j = 1 we have pj = 1 + kj(1) and a further increase of j has no e￿ect.
14For an inferior good the introduction of a subsidy improves welfare, as then cjH[L] < cjL.
15Observe that in the Atkinson-Stiglitz model a case for a positive (negative) tax arises if the good is a complement
(substitute) to leisure. In our model the argument for taxing good j would be reinforced if it were a complement
to leisure and weakened if it were a substitute.
14rather arbitrary it is impossible to draw any precise conclusion on the optimal structure of 1 and
2 for the general case. What one can see is that uniform tax rates will only arise by coincidence,
in general optimal tax rates will di￿er. To gain more insight we now turn to two special cases. The
￿rst one deals with uniform evasion costs for both commodities, which implies that for 1 = 2
￿rms would conceal the same fraction j of c1 and c2. The second special case assumes that only
the tax on one of the two goods can be evaded.
4.1 Uniform evasion costs for both commodity taxes
Assume now that evasion costs are uniform, i.e. k1(1) = k2(2), the cost of concealing a fraction
j is the same for both goods. This special case allows us to draw some conclusions under what
circumstances uniform commodity taxation is optimal.
Proposition 3: Given uniform evasion costs for both commodities, uniform commodity taxes
are optimal if preferences for c1 and c2 are homothetic and weakly separable between consumption
and labor supply.
Proof: The derivation of proposition 3 is provided in the Appendix.
Clearly with identical evasion costs a motive for di￿erential commodity taxation can only arise
from some asymmetry of the households’ preferences with respect to the two commodities. Propo-
sition (3) states that for homothetic preferences (i. e., when the relative importance of the two
goods does not vary with the available budget) a uniform commodity tax is optimal. This result
is especially interesting as it is related to a standard result of the optimum taxation literature,
which states that if income is subject to an optimal linear income tax, uniform commodity tax-
ation is optimal if preferences between consumption and labor supply are weakly separable and
if Engel curves for goods are linear (see for example Deaton, 1979). We ￿nd that if individuals
di￿er in initial wealth and if commodity taxes can be evaded at a uniform cost, preferences have to
be weakly separable between consumption and labor and homothetic in consumption for uniform
commodity taxes to be optimal, even if income can be taxed nonlinearly. Note that in our model
initial wealth exists and can only be taxed at a proportional rate, which is the analogy to the
restriction in Deaton (1979) that income can only be taxed linearly.
One can show that with Stone-Geary preferences, which allow to model a luxury and a necessity
good in a simple way, our model would call for taxing the luxury good higher than the necessity
15good. This is in contrast to the standard result mentioned above, because with Stone-Geary
preferences Engel curves are still linear. 16
4.2 Taxes on good two cannot be evaded
Assume now that taxes on good 2 cannot be evaded because marginal evasion costs are in￿nitely
high, i.e. k0
2(0) = 1. A possible illustration for such a scenario could be that c1 represents services
while c2 represents goods, as it is plausible that it is easier to evade taxes on services than on
goods. Clearly, the assumption that a tax on some good cannot be evaded at all is too strict,
but it helps to illustrate the point we want to make. Intuitively one might expect that such a
situation would call for taxing the commodity that cannot be evaded higher than the commodity
for which tax evasion is possible. However, it turns out that this need not be the case as one also
has to take into account the distorting e￿ects on compensated demand. This can be seen from




























Optimal tax rates for 1 and 2 have to satisfy this condition. We can conclude that given normal
goods the right-hand side of (17) must be positive. It is well-known that compensated demand






@pk = 0, for k = 1;2 and any i = L;H. This and











@pk ), k = 1;2, in the numerator and denominator, respectively, of the RHS
of (17) have opposite signs for arbitrary ~ 1;2. They clearly cannot be zero. This in turn means
that the denominator must be positive because otherwise the RHS of (17) would be negative (the














p2. Finally, using (5) and 2 = 0, we get 1(1   1)  2(1 + k1(1)), which obviously
holds for 1 = 2 as 1 < 1 and k1(1) > 0. Thus, without specifying in more detail the cost
function k1(1) and preferences we cannot tell whether 1 ? 2 is optimal.
16For Stone-Geary preferences the sub-utility function of c1;c2 reads u(c1;c2) = (c1   1)a1(c2   2)a2, where
j > 0 and 0 < aj < 1. The parameter j can be interpreted as the subsistence level of consumption for good j
and aj=(a1 + a2) as the marginal budget share.
165 Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the standard model of optimum income taxation by an important
aspect, which conforms to reality: individuals di￿er not only in earning abilities, but also in initial
wealth. The government can impose a rather comprehensive set of taxes: a nonlinear tax on labor
income and proportional taxes on wealth and on commodities. Moreover, we have introduced the
restriction that the latter two taxes can - at some cost - be evaded by individuals and ￿rms, resp.
We analyzed the question of whether there is a role for these taxes in a welfare-maximizing tax
system.
It turned out that, given the essential condition that abilities and initial wealth are positively
correlated, a tax on wealth - in addition to an optimal nonlinear income tax - is desirable, even if
it can be evaded. Further, even if income and wealth are taxed optimally, taxes on commodities
still raise social welfare, given that consumption increases with income. Thus, the result in the
Atkinson-Stiglitz model, that an optimal income tax does not need to be supplemented by com-
modity taxes if preferences are weakly separable between labor and consumption, does not arise in
our model. The main reason for this clearly comes from the existence of initial wealth as a second
characteristic, which distinguishes individuals and calls for redistribution via the wealth tax. As
the deadweight loss of evasion is of second order, it can be disregarded as long as the tax rate is
not too high. On the other hand, a tax on commodities can, in principle, perform the same task
as the tax on wealth (Brunner and Pech, 2008). However, due to the second-order e￿ect of tax
evasion it is optimal to impose both proportional taxes in our model, instead of only one, because
then the overall deadweight loss is smaller.
Thus, our model provides, in a realistic framework, a rationale for the existence of a compre-
hensive tax system, as we ￿nd it in most industrialized economies. Clearly, it would be interesting
to extend our model and consider the possibility that also the income tax can be evaded. We
abstained from this in order to keep the model tractable. However, the result by Boadway et al.
(1994) that in the standard Mirrlees model a case for indirect taxes arises given the income tax
can be evaded while the indirect taxes cannot, indicates that our results should remain valid even
with evasion of the income tax.
In our model, the optimal structure of commodity taxes depends on the individuals’ preferences
and on the evasion technology, but also on the di￿erences in initial wealth. Speci￿cally, the reference
case that uniform commodity taxes are optimal arises, if evasion costs are identical for all goods
and if preferences over the consumption goods are homothetic (independent of wealth di￿erence).
As a further special case we considered the situation when only the tax on one of the two goods
17can be evaded. Contrary to intuition it turns out that it may be optimal to tax the good for which
evasion is possible higher than the other good.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem (7)-(9) reads
L = fLvL(xL;zL;eL;e;1;2) + fHvH(xH;zH;eL;e;1;2)   (xL + xH   zL   zH  
e((1   eL)eL + (1   eH)eH)   1(1   1)(c1L + c1H)   2(1   2)(c2L + c2H) + g)
+(vH(xH;zH;eL;e;1;2)   vH(xL;zL;eH;e;1;2)): (A1)
To abbreviate notation we write vH[L]  vH(xL;zL;eH;e;1;2). Using the envelope theorem we




















































@e =  (1   ei). Plugging those expressions into (A2) and substituting for fi
@vi
@xi from (10) and
(11) yields equation (14) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2
We make again use of the envelope theorem. The derivative of the optimal value function S(e;1;2)
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18use of these expressions and substituting for fi
@vi





























By use of the Slutsky equation on gets equation (15) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3
First, observe that with k1(1) = k2(2) for 1 = 2, we have p1 = p2 (use (5)) and ~ 1 = ~ 2, if


























@pj ) = 0,
for ~ 1 = ~ 2  ~ . This means that on the RHS of (16) the e￿ects on compensated demand are zero.















Finally, if preferences of each individual i for good 1 and 2 are homothetic and weakly separable
between consumption and labor, each individual i spends the same constant share gj of her budget







which is obviously true. Altogether we have shown that with uniform evasion costs, weakly sepa-
rable and homothetic preferences the optimality condition (16) is ful￿lled for 1 = 2.
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